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The Report is published further to the attribution of the 2011 Energy Transparency Award (ETA). The 
ETA prize is assigned every year by the Florence School of Regulation to a company or institution for 
their particular contribution to the transparency of energy markets in Europe. The ETA is financed by 
a fund managed by the Florence School of Regulation and RWE is the initiator and the sponsor of the 
initiative. The purpose of the ETA is the promotion of transparency, which plays a fundamental role in 
favouring market well-functioning as well as economic and technical efficiency.
 

1Executive Summary
This Report presents the main initiatives which 
contributed to promote and enhance the 
transparency of European wholesale energy 
markets in the year 2011.
The year 2011 was particularly landmarked by 
the development of the public dimension of 
transparency governance: a tailor-made regulation 
(Regulation on wholesale Energy Market Integrity 
and Transparency, also known by the acronym 
“REMIT”) of the European Parliament and the 
Council was precisely dedicated to the promotion 
of transparency and integrity in the European 
wholesale energy markets. The new Regulation 
allowed to fill the gaps in the existing regulation. 
While several regional markets had implemented 
at their own initiative various measures to promote 
transparency and integrity – for example, Nord 
Pool had implemented reporting requirements for 
fundamental data already in 2002 – the existing 
regulation had proved partial and unable to 
provide adequate governance to such complex and 
interconnected markets at EU level, where both 
financial and physical transactions are executed by 
different types of operators.
The REMIT is mainly built on three pillars: i) 
the prohibition of inside information; ii) the 
prohibition of market manipulation; and iii) 
the regulation of monitoring and surveillance 
functions, mainly performed by the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
in close collaboration with National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs). 
The REMIT’s potential in terms of improvement 
and development of energy trading in Europe 
is vast. Some of REMIT’s basic elements have 
successfully been implemented already in the 
past decade in the Nordic Wholesale Market. 
However, a major role in producing the expected 
outcome will be played by the effectiveness of its 
implementation, which requires a remarkable 
load of work to be undertaken by the different 
parties involved – including both national (NRAs, 
Member States) and supra-national institutions 
(European Commission, ACER) – and leaves some 
scope for disharmonised procedures and sanctions 
to be established across the EU. Moreover, the 
needs and behaviour of the end-users may have to 
be addressed more clearly. 
In the pre-REMIT context, with no precise and 
common rules concerning what information 
should be disclosed, and to whom, how and how 
often, the 2011 pro-transparency initiatives of 
public bodies (such as ERGEG, CEER, ACER and 
other regulatory agencies) and private market 
operators still played a remarkable role, and 
allowed developing transparency and integrity 
beyond the requirements established by the law 
in force. For example, TSOs can contribute to the 
development of a transparent market environment 
with the publication of fundamental and real-
time data, and increased  cooperation at EU and 
regional levels. NRAs had also made efforts to 
develop a market monitoring and surveillance 
function themselves but with a very high level of 
diversity in their scope. As long as this Report 
is concerned, two specific case studies of energy 
trading via exchanges (EEX and Powernext) show 
the typical transparency features of exchanges, 
which include the publication of transactional 
data, fundamental data and price indexes, as well 
as the establishment of monitoring practices to 
prevent market misconducts.
In fact, all of these remarkable “self-regulation” 
initiatives can only develop uneven standards and 
market conditions for traders across Europe. In 
light of this lack of harmonisation, the entry into 
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force of the REMIT offered a unique opportunity 
to raise and level out the transparency and 
integrity standards in any energy and capacity 
trading activity in Europe, in order to ensure a 
more efficient trading environment to all market 
agents, ultimately to the benefit of European 
energy consumers. 
31. INTRODUCTION
In October 2011 the European Parliament and 
the Council issued a tailor-made Regulation 
on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency.1 The Regulation, largely known 
by the acronym REMIT, entered into force on 
28th December 2011 and established a common 
regulatory framework for energy trading at 
European level.
As highlighted in last year’s Report, such rules 
had been long-awaited by market operators and 
stakeholders.2 Transparency has the power to 
create a level playing field, reduce the scope for 
anti-competitive practices and more generally, 
increase market operators’ confidence in fair 
pricing mechanisms.
A well-functioning wholesale market is 
fundamental for the whole energy system, 
including the downstream market, since suppliers 
source the energy they need from the wholesale 
market and pay wholesale prices.3 Accordingly, 
there is a clear regulatory interest in having efficient 
wholesale markets, where energy and (сross-
border) transportation capacity is fairly priced 
and abuses are prevented. In this case, wholesale 
markets provide a mechanism to purchase energy 
and manage the risk, promote competition and 
facilitate new entry all along the value chain.
1  Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011, OJ L 326/1 of 8 Decem-
ber 2011.
2  For further details, cf. 2010 Edition of the Report (Mi-
chetti, 2011).
3  The definition of “wholesale market” in REMIT in-
cludes OTC, derivate and bilateral markets: “Wholesale energy 
markets encompass both commodity markets and derivative 
markets, which are of vital 
importance to the energy and financial markets, and price forma-
tion in both sectors is interlinked. They 
include, inter alia, regulated markets, multilateral trading facili-
ties and over-the-counter (OTC) transactions 
and bilateral contracts, direct or through brokers.” (page 1, (5) of 
Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011, OJ L 326/1 of 8 December 2011).
In the pre-REMIT context, pan-European energy 
trading activities were combined with a framework 
featured by nation-wide oversight, that mostly 
lacked clear provisions for the prohibition of 
market abuse on trading venues and that mostly 
lacked the visibility of trading, due to the lack of 
transactional data reporting and to the limited 
access to fundamental data.4 This means that so 
far the majority of transactions have not been 
reported and NRAs have not been in the position to 
catch the entire extent of energy trading activities, 
based on both commodities and derivatives. 
Thus, a harmonised set of specific rules for the 
promotion of market integrity and transparency 
was advocated in view of the good functioning of 
European energy markets.
In the context of liberalised energy markets, the 
REMIT has the potential to work as a tool that 
is complementary to competition policy in the 
pursuing of market well-functioning. While 
competition policy addresses the issues deriving 
from the opening of the markets - such as the 
competition between incumbent operators, with 
significant market power, and smaller operators 
-, the REMIT regulates transparency and integrity 
in market conducts, in order to guarantee that i) 
the relevant information is available to market 
operators (transparency), and ii) the available 
information is not opportunistically used to the 
detriment of fair competition (integrity). In light 
of the REMIT, transparency and integrity become 
two prerequisites for the lawful market conduct 
of any operator, independent of the market power 
and the actual ability to implement opportunistic 
behaviours. In particular, the new dedicated 
regulation for market integrity and transparency 
defines and prohibits trading on inside information 
4  Nord Pool is an exception: a reporting obligation was 
established in 2002 and the reporting system, in the form of Ur-
gent Market Messages (UMMs), has been further developed and 
elaborated since.
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and market manipulation. Moreover, it establishes 
explicit market monitoring and data collection 
duties for ACER. 
Following a broad overview on European energy 
trading in Section 2, Section 3 surveys the 
provisions included in the REMIT concerning 
inside information, market manipulation and 
market monitoring activities, in the innovative 
context of a tailor-made regulation for European 
energy trading.  
Section 4 analyses the major issues related to the 
implementation of the REMIT, including those 
related to the multi-level nature of the governance 
of transparency. 
Section 5 surveys the most relevant pro-
transparency initiatives undertaken by public 
bodies, such as the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and ACER, while Section 
6 reports the transparency developments 
registered by two power exchanges, presented as 
case studies: EEX and Powernext. Also thanks 
to their centralised structure, energy exchanges 
typically disclose relevant information to traders 
and establish surveillance mechanisms to avoid 
market misconducts. As a result, their price and 
quantity signals are generally deemed reliable and 
their price references indexes are even used as 
benchmark for OTC trading, which still represents 
the large majority of energy trading in Europe.
Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding 
remarks.  
2. OVERVIEW ON ENERGY TRADING
Competitive energy wholesale markets play a 
key role in ensuring an efficient energy system. 
The energy price in the wholesale market, for 
instance, represents a considerable component of 
retail price. In the EU, excluding taxes, the part of 
the average energy bill that is represented by the 
cost of wholesale electricity is around 60% for 
electricity and 40% for gas (European Parliament’s 
Committee on ITRE, 2010; Ofgem, 2011). 
Wholesale markets typically enable suppliers 
to source the energy they need to operate in the 
downstream market. In some specific cases, 
suppliers source their energy in different ways, 
notably through vertical integration or bilateral 
contracts:
•	 Those suppliers who are part of integrated 
companies which also operate in the genera-
tion segment of the value chain, will be in the 
position to utilize the benefits of a vertically 
integrated structure and source their energy 
within the integrated structure, with no need 
to turn to the wholesale market.
•	 Suppliers can establish long-term bilateral 
contracts directly with electricity generators or 
gas producers, thus using an alternative way to 
buy and sell energy (although these volumes 
may be subsequently traded in the wholesale 
market). 
However, under all other circumstances, suppliers 
typically buy the electricity and the natural gas 
they need from the wholesale market and pay 
5wholesale prices: a well-functioning market, 
for instance, allows those who are not part of a 
vertically-integrated organisation to source their 
energy and compete in the downstream market. 
In other words, well-functioning wholesale 
markets provide a mechanism to purchase energy, 
promote competition and facilitate new entry in 
all segments of the energy supply chain. 
Accordingly, there is a clear regulatory interest 
in wholesale prices to be fairly set and not be 
manipulated or distorted.
2.1 Exchanges vs. OTC Trading
Energy trading on wholesale markets (both 
prompt and forward) typically concerns either 
exchanges or over-the-counter (OTC) platforms. 
Exchanges allow parties to anonymously trade 
commodities, derivatives and other financial 
instruments and trade standardised contracts 
on standard terms and conditions. Moreover, 
exchanges publish pricing information that is often 
used as a reference for both OTC and structured 
contracts.   
However, the biggest portion of trading concerning 
electricity and gas in Europe takes place in the OTC 
market. As regards electricity trading in 2009, for 
example, according to the European Commission, 
75 per cent of electricity was traded OTC, while 
only 25 per cent was traded via power exchanges 
(European Commission, 2010a).5 
Energy trading in Europe involves a multitude 
of market operators of different nature, including 
5  The OTC market is less dominant in the Nordic market 
due to the successful implementation of the Nordic financial elec-
tricity exchange, Nasdaq OMX. Even though, the share of cleared 
OTC trading on the Nordic market, which doesn’t take in account 
non-cleared OTC trading, is still a considerable 40% (Nordic En-
ergy Regulators, 2012).
physical participants (such as generators and 
suppliers) and non-physical participants, which 
usually trade for speculative purposes. The 
boundaries between the two categories are far 
from being clear-cut: on the one side physical 
participants may engage in speculative trading, 
while on the other side non-physical market 
participants also take contracts for physical 
delivery. 
Energy trading includes different market segments 
for electricity and gas, but also hard coal, CO2 and 
oil. A wide range of products is traded accordingly:
§	Spot, forward, futures and options 
products in the electricity market;
§	Spot, forward, futures, swaps and options 
products in the natural gas market;
§	Spot, forward, futures, swaps and options 
products in the hard coal market;
§	Spot, forward and futures in the CO2 
market;
§	Spot, forward, futures, swaps and options 
products in the oil market.   
While spot products refer to trading for delivery 
in the same day as the trade, forward trading 
consists of trades over a longer duration, and 
may include trades which are months, seasons 
or even years ahead of delivery. Physical market 
participants typically buy or sell forward and 
use spot and prompt markets to fine-tune their 
position and manage their risk. For example, 
electricity generators and gas producers typically 
manage the risk deriving from the sale of energy, 
while suppliers typically manage the risk deriving 
from both variations in the cost of energy and 
price volatility (Ofgem, 2009).
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2.2 Trading in Energy Exchanges
The figures concerning the volumes of electricity 
and natural gas traded at European exchanges in 
recent years clearly show that trading activities 
have been enhanced. 
As regards electricity trading, in particular, 
European power trading hubs have witnessed 
increased liquidity, higher number of participants, 
and price convergence. Price convergence has 
further been enhanced by the ongoing coupling 
of the EU electricity markets, such as the 
introduction of price market coupling in the 
Central Western Europe (CWE) region and the 
interim tight coupling between the CWE and the 
Nordic markets. The biggest power exchanges are 
EPEX (Leipzig and Paris), Nord Pool (Oslo) and 
APX/Endex (Amsterdam) for spot and futures 
products, while other important power exchanges, 
such as OMEL (Madrid), EXAA (Graz), Belpex 
(Brussels), APX UK (London), GME (Italy), OTE 
(Prague), PPX (Warsaw), Borzen (Ljubljana) and 
Opcom (Bucharest) mainly trade spot products 
(RWE, 2011).
Total trading volumes per year in continental 
Europe increased from 3,000 TWh in 2003 to 
12,500 TWh (annualized) in the first quarter of 
2012 (DG Energy, 2012a). Also the number of 
participants increased with EEX and Nord Pool 
Spot respectively reporting around 220 and 370 
participants in 2011. Moreover, prices in European 
power trading are converging more and more as 
a result of the development of emissions trading, 
of the globalisation of fuel markets and of the 
proceeding market coupling in electricity (RWE, 
2011).
Similar trends of increased liquidity and number 
of market participants have been featuring the 
trading of natural gas. Natural gas is exchanged 
at: ICE/APX (London), Powernext (Paris), APX/
NP-Endex (Amsterdam) and EEX (Leipzig), while 
further trading hubs are NBP (UK), Zeebrugge 
(Belgium), TTF (Netherlands), Gaspool 
(Germany), NCG (Germany), CEGH (Austria), 
PEG (France), CDG (Spain) and PSV (Italy). Hub 
traded volumes increased remarkably from less 
than 650 bcm in 2003 to 1700 bcm in 2011, with 
NBP holding the biggest market share (67%) in 
2011, followed by TTF (9%) and NCG (7%) (DG 
Energy, 2012b ).
Moreover, price convergence is also featuring 
the European gas market. NBP, in the UK, is the 
most liquid natural gas market in Europe and 
Table 1. Traded market size of European wholesale energy markets according to the UK broker survey 
Traded size in 2011 
Change compared to 
2010
Change compared to  
2009
Electricity 6,200,339 GWh +27% +51%
Gas 6,259,668 GWh +27% +93%
Emissions 2,553,945,866 metric tonnes -13% -14%
Source: Our elaboration of data from Financial Services Authority (2011; 2012).
7basically works as a benchmark for the price on 
the continent, notwithstanding the low physical 
interconnection of the markets. The existing price 
differences may be usually explained in terms 
of transportation costs or short-term physical 
constraints (RWE, 2011). 
2.3 Trading Outside Energy Ex-
changes: The FSA Broker Survey 
2011
An interesting reference in the analysis of trading 
activity in the European energy markets in 2011 is 
provided by the survey conducted by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the authority in charge 
of the regulation of the financial services industry 
in the United Kingdom. The survey concerns 
trading in the energy markets (precisely gas, 
power, coal and emissions traded markets, both 
national and European) in the period between 1st 
August 2010 and 31st July 2011, and it is restricted 
to UK brokers. 
The broker survey shows that the absolute number 
of trades increased compared to the previous year 
both in the European gas market and in the Eu-
ropean electricity market, with increases ranging 
between 9% and 15%. On the contrary, the emis-
sions market shrunk by 43% compared to the pre-
vious year. The FSA believes that this substantive 
reduction is due to the combination of the success 
of the exchange-traded emissions contracts,6 as 
well as to the temporary decline in market confi-
dence following a phishing attack which tempo-
rarily affected transaction volumes in early 2011. 
Moreover, according to the survey, both the Eu-
6  The ECX/ICE trading platform accounts for 80% of the 
exchange traded volume on the European carbon market. The 
other major exchanges upon which EU ETS compliant carbon 
credits and their derivatives are traded are the NASDAQ OMX 
Commodities Europe (formerly Nord Pool), BlueNext and EEX 
(Carbon Investments, 2011).
ropean power market and the European gas mar-
ket grew by 27% compared to the previous year, 
respectively reaching up to 6,200,339 GWh and 
6,259,668 GWh (FSA, 2011).
The figures reported in Table 1 are limited to 
the sample of UK brokers and do not include 
exchange-traded energy. However, the remarkable 
expansion registered in the size of European gas 
and electricity markets clearly suggests a positive 
trend. Similarly, the decrease in the size of the 
emissions market can be interpreted as a signal of 
the growth of exchange-based emissions trading.
3. A NEW GOVERNANCE FOR 
TRANSPARENCY: THE REMIT
Liberalised European energy markets are in big 
need of transparency. The first energy package 
laid the basis for an EU-wide librealised energy 
market in 1996 and led to a prodigious increase 
in EU-wide trading as well as to more complex, 
sophisticated and interconnected markets:7
“Therefore the concern to ensure the 
integrity of markets cannot be a matter 
only for individual Member States. Strong 
cross-border market monitoring is essential 
for the completion of a fully functioning, 
interconnected and integrated internal energy 
market.”8 
As a matter of fact, bottom-up nation-based or 
sector-specific rules and monitoring practices have 
proved unable to provide an adequate EU-wide 
regulatory framework for transparency and integrity. 
7  For instance, the overall volume of electricity traded 
via both exchanges and OTC almost tripled between 2000 and 
2009, increasing from 3,500 TWh to10,000 TWh (European 
Commission, 2010).
8  Section (4), preamble of Regulation (EU) No. 1227/2011, 
OJ L 326/1 of 8 December 2011.
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The Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 on Wholesale 
Energy Market Integrity and Transparency 
(REMIT) precisely provides a common regulatory 
framework for the promotion of transparency 
and integrity in wholesale energy markets, for 
the benefit of final consumers of energy. The 
Regulation was published on the Official Journal 
of the European Union on 8th December 2011 
and entered into force on 28th December 2011. 
The experience of the European energy markets 
shows that markets fail to provide transparency 
and integrity automatically, so that specific and 
dedicated rules and enforcement mechanisms 
are required. In fact, the lack of transparency 
and integrity and the absence of effective 
market monitoring may leave scope for market 
misconducts, and thus prevent fair competition.
Competition policy has always been an important 
pillar of the European Union agenda. In view 
of market well-functioning and consumer 
welfare, competition policy in Europe aims 
to create non-discriminatory access to the 
open markets to all operators, and to prevent 
those who hold a significant market power to 
behave opportunistically to the detriment of fair 
competition. The REMIT represents an important 
complementary instrument to competition policy 
in the pursuit of market well-functioning: it 
explains what information should be disclosed 
and how the available information should be used, 
and thus clarifies the features of the information 
framework for any trading activity involving any 
market participant in Europe. 
Higher transparency ensures that more 
information is available. The disclosure of the 
information which is deemed relevant in light of 
the good functioning of the market, affects the 
possibility for market operators to receive efficient 
market signals before making their choices. With 
no precise and common rules concerning what 
information should be disclosed, and to whom, 
how and how often, the pre-REMIT context was 
featured by a considerable variety of transparency 
practices implemented by market operators across 
Europe with different outcomes. By contrast, 
the new setting establishes clear disclosure 
requirements and data collection responsibilities 
for NRAs and ACER. 
Higher integrity entails that the available 
information is used in a fair fashion, in order to 
avoid damaging the other market participants. 
The remarkable contribution of the REMIT in this 
area is related first of all, to the definition of the 
market misconducts which should be sanctioned 
across the European energy market, and second, to 
the establishment of monitoring and surveillance 
duties, aiming at the detection and prevention of 
such misconducts. 
Overall, the REMIT builds up an integrated 
regulatory framework addressing some of the 
misconducts which are most detrimental for 
market well-functioning. It does so by focusing on 
three “pillars”: i) Prohibition of inside information; 
ii) Prohibition of market manipulation; and 
iii) Regulation of monitoring and surveillance 
functions, mainly performed by the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in 
close collaboration with the National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs).
Subject Matter and Scope
The new Regulation establishes a set of rules 
prohibiting abusive practices on wholesale energy 
markets, coherently with the existing rules on 
financial markets (Art. 1). Accordingly, it applies 
to trading in wholesale energy products, with the 
exception of those financial instrument already 
9covered by the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).9 
In view of the detection and prevention of abusive 
behaviours, the Regulation assigns fundamental 
monitoring functions to the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), 
which has a duty of collaboration with NRAs 
(Art. 1). Finally, the Regulation takes into account 
the interaction between wholesale energy markets 
and the Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) of 
the European Union (Art. 1), which is the largest 
scheme for the exchange of greenhouse gases 
emission allowances implemented in the world.10
It is possible to identify three different pillars upon 
which the Regulation is built: 
i) The prohibition of inside information;
ii) The prohibition of market manipulation; 
and
iii) The regulation of monitoring and 
surveillance functions, i.e., a number of 
activities performed by ACER in close 
collaboration with NRAs, including the 
registration of market participants, the 
reporting of suspected practices and the 
enforcement of the regulation. 
Prohibition of Insider Trading
The Regulation clearly defines inside information 
as the “Information of a precise nature which has 
not been made public, which relates, directly or 
indirectly, to one or more wholesale energy products 
and which, if it were made public, would be likely 
to significantly affect the prices of those wholesale 
energy products” (Art. 2).
9  Directive 2003/6/EC, OJ L 96/16 of 12 April 2003.
10  Cfr. European Union, Climate Action: “Emission Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS)”, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/in-
dex_en.htm.
First of all, the Regulation prohibits trading on inside 
information, i.e., misusing inside information to 
obtain monetary or competitive advantages. This 
means that those who hold inside information are 
prohibited to: use the information to acquire or 
dispose of the wholesale energy products to which 
that information relates; disclose that information 
to other persons; recommend or induce other 
people to acquire or dispose of wholesale energy 
products to which that information relates (Art. 3).
Second, the Regulation establishes the obligation 
to publish inside information. Market participants 
are obliged to disclose effectively and timely the 
inside information which they hold, especially that 
concerning the capacity and use of facilities for 
production, storage, consumption or transmission 
of electricity or natural gas, and the capacity 
and use of LNG facilities, including planned 
and unplanned unavailability of these facilities. 
The disclosure of inside information can be only 
delayed by market participants if this is necessary 
to protect their legitimate interests. However, in 
any case, the delay should not have the effect of 
misleading the public. Moreover, during the time 
of the delay, the operator concerned has to ensure 
the confidentiality of the inside information 
and cannot take trading decisions based on that 
information (Art. 4).
Prohibition of Market Manipula-
tion
The Regulation defines “market manipulation” 
through the identification of a number of abusive 
practices (Art. 2), such as:
i) Entering into a wholesale 
transaction which gives false or 
misleading signals concerning the 
supply or the demand or the price 
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of wholesale energy products;
ii) Securing or even trying to secure 
the price of a product at an artificial 
level;
iii) Implementing deceptive behav-
iours which give false or mislead-
ing signals to the market;
iv) Disseminating through the media 
information, which gives false or 
misleading signals to the market, 
as well as disseminating false or 
misleading news.
The Regulation recognises the abusive nature 
of these practices and their potential in working 
to the detriment of market well-functioning, 
and accordingly prohibits market manipulation 
activities (Art. 5). 
Monitoring, Surveillance and 
Other Duties of ACER
In order to detect and prevent the misuse of inside 
information and market manipulation activities 
by market participants, the Regulation establishes 
clear monitoring duties for ACER and NRAs (Art. 
7). These additional duties of ACER provide for 
an extension of the activity scope of the Agency to 
the field of market transparency and integrity and 
contribute to enlightening the crucial role of these 
two issues in the promotion of effective regulation 
and energy market integration. 
In particular, further to the REMIT, ACER holds 
the responsibility for market monitoring activities 
- to be undertaken in cooperation with NRAs -, 
and for the collection of both transactional and 
fundamental data from market participants.
In light of the responsibility on market monitoring, 
NRAs have an obligation to immediately inform 
ACER in case they suspect that abusive market 
practices concerning trading on inside information 
or market manipulation are preventing the well-
functioning of wholesale energy market in their 
Member State or in any other Member State (Art. 
16). Similarly, any person professionally arranging 
transactions with wholesale energy products 
who reasonably suspects that a transaction might 
breach the REMIT, has to notify the NRA (Art. 
15).        
In case of infringement, penalties are applied by 
the Member State concerned. More precisely, 
Member States are responsible for setting the rules 
concerning effective, dissuasive and proportionate 
penalties applicable to infringements of the 
Regulation. Moreover, they are responsible for 
ensuring that they are implemented. Penalties 
must reflect the nature, duration and seriousness 
of the infringement, the damage caused to 
consumers and the potential gains from trading 
deriving from inside information or market 
manipulation. The rules set by Member States 
on this regard will have to be notified to the 
Commission within 18 months after the entry into 
force of the Regulation, i.e., by 29 June 2013 (Art. 
18). This arrangement implies the existence of a 
diversity of national enforcement regimes which is 
suboptimal as compared to a regime harmonized 
at the EU level and may therefore not work in an 
effective and efficient way.
As for the responsibility of ACER in data 
collection, the Regulation establishes a duty for 
market participants to provide ACER with a record 
of all wholesale energy market transactions (so-
called “transactional data transparency”). These 
records must specify, at least: product bought or 
sold, price and quantity agreed, date and time of 
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the transaction, parties involved in the transaction 
and beneficiaries of the transaction. Similarly, 
the Regulation establishes a duty for market 
participants to provide both ACER and NRAs with 
the information on the capacity and the use of 
facilities for production, storage, consumption, or 
transmission of electricity or natural gas, as well as 
LNG facilities (“fundamental data transparency”). 
The European Commission is in charge of working 
on the implementation of these data collection rules. 
More precisely, the Commission is responsible, 
by means of implementing acts, for listing the 
contracts and derivatives that must be reported to 
ACER, and adopting uniform reporting rules and 
procedures for the disclosure of both transactional 
and fundamental data (Art. 8).
Apart from these two major areas of activity, 
namely market monitoring and data collection, 
the Regulation establishes further relevant 
responsibilities for ACER. First of all, ACER is 
deemed responsible for the creation of a European 
register of wholesale market participants. All 
market participants involved in the transactions 
that reported to ACER, have to register at the NRA 
of the Member State where they are based or where 
they are resident. NRAs will set national registers 
and then transfer the information included in their 
registers to ACER, in a format that ACER itself 
will have to determine in cooperation with NRAs. 
ACER will then be responsible for the collection of 
all of the information and the creation of a single 
European register of market participants (Art. 9).
Moreover, in view of effective cooperation, the 
Regulation deems ACER responsible also for the 
identification and implementation of efficient 
mechanisms to collaborate and share the relevant 
information with other authorities, including 
NRAs, financial authorities and national 
competition authorities (Art. 10). Finally, ACER 
is responsible for the confidentiality, integrity and 
protection of all the information that is received 
and kept in its system (Art. 12). This will be a 
comprehensive task and it is therefore essential 
that ACER will have at its disposal the appropriate 
resources in terms of staff and (IT) budget.
4. IMPLEMENTING THE REMIT 
Before the introduction of the REMIT, energy 
trading at pan-European level was combined with 
only nation-wide oversight, no clear definition or 
prohibition of market abuse on trading venues and 
finally, no visibility of trading, due to the lack of 
transactional data transparency and to the limited 
access to fundamental data. 
The new dedicated regulation for market integrity 
and transparency defines and prohibits trading on 
inside information and market manipulation. It 
also establishes for the Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulation explicit market monitoring 
and data collection duties. In particular, in order 
to overcome the previous lack of harmonisation 
and the existing regulatory gaps, the REMIT 
promotes the implementation of a more holistic 
approach to energy markets, based on both wider 
commodity coverage and centralised monitoring 
and reporting functions (DG Energy of the 
European Commission, 2011). 
The REMIT does have a potential to fundamentally 
improve and develop energy trading integrity 
and transparency in Europe. However, the extent 
to which this potential will be fully exploited 
will mainly depend on the effectiveness of its 
implementation. It should be clear that the 
implementation will require a remarkable load of 
work to be undertaken by the different involved 
parties, especially ACER and the NRAs. Moreover, 
for the effective implementation the quality of the 
collected data will be of essential importance.
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•	 The European Commission will have to work 
on the implementing legislation;
•	 Member States will have to ensure that NRAs 
hold adequate and effective enforcement and 
penalty powers;
•	 ACER will have to prepare its data collection 
and analysis operations and the efficient 
mechanisms to cooperate with NRAs; It will 
also have to build up its human / analytical 
capacity to meet the expectations of REMIT. 
An increase in staff is unavoidable.  
•	 NRAs will have to set up the registries; and 
finally,
•	 Market participants will have to ensure 
compliance – in practical terms, this implies 
that market operators will have to understand 
the reporting obligations, collect the relevant 
information, compile the forms and deal with 
the bureaucratic procedure established by the 
registration requirement. 
As a result, a number of relevant implementation 
challenges can be identified. 
4.1 Registration vs. EU Trading 
Passport
One of the issues that the REMIT addresses is the 
existence of particular national licensing regimes 
which may prevent market entry and market 
integration by foreclosing national markets. The 
NRAs, via CEER, had proposed the introduction 
of a Europe-wide Energy wholesale Trading 
Passport. The Trading Passport was intended as 
a form of certification allowing to trade in all of 
the countries of the European Economic Area and 
replacing the existing national licensing regimes.  
The benefits of such Passport were mainly 
identified in the possibility to reduce bureaucracy 
and create a single certification allowing trading 
in all of wholesale energy markets in Europe. The 
simplification deriving from the Passport mainly 
concerned the establishment of a “one-stop shop” 
for traders and a more efficient allocation of the 
monitoring functions: only the NRA of the home 
country of the market participant was going to be 
responsible for the compliance with the licences 
and their allocation.
The Passport was proposed by the Rapporteur 
of the European Parliament, but was finally not 
agreed by the Council. The REMIT introduced 
a national registration requirement for market 
participants instead. 
According to this registration system, every 
market participant has to register once, using a 
format which will be determined by ACER within 
the six months following the entry into force of the 
REMIT. The content of the registration form will 
be determined via the coordinated approach by 
NRAs and will be publicly consulted with market 
participants.
There is a major difference between the regime 
installed by the REMIT and that initially proposed 
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by CEER: the registration requirement established 
by the REMIT will apply on top of the several 
national access regimes which will continue to 
be implemented. On the contrary, the Trading 
Passport would have replaced the existing 
national licensing regimes. Accordingly, the latter 
solution would have represented a more powerful 
tool to create an EU level playing field and avoid 
unnecessary administration costs (CEER, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the REMIT leaves room for an 
adjustment of the regulatory framework in the near 
future. After one year from the entry into force of 
the registration regime, the European Commission 
will have to assess the functioning and usefulness 
of this system. Should the registration regime 
not prove effective in delivering the expected 
outcomes in terms of transparency and integrity, 
the Commission will have the chance to consider 
the implementation of further instruments, 
including the Trading Passport. 
4.2 National vs. European Re-
quirements for Collecting Data 
The collection of data by ACER is without prejudice 
to the right of NRAs to collect additional data for 
national purposes. This means that in some cases 
market participants will have to comply with 
additional transparency requirements outside 
those established by the REMIT.
The fact that national reporting obligations are 
not restricted in light of the REMIT, weakens 
the degree of harmonisation of data collection 
practices across the EU. Market participants 
will have to keep on dealing with different 
requirements, submission methods, formats, as 
well as languages. 
The issue of the combination of national and 
supranational (European) requirements for data 
collection is related to the multi-level nature of 
the governance of transparency.11 When rules are 
established and enforced at different competing 
levels of governance, a high degree of coordination 
is required in order for the overall institutional 
framework to deliver efficient outcomes. By 
contrast, the lack of coordination among the 
different levels may cause both overlapping and 
inconsistency. This in turn increases regulatory 
uncertainty and inevitably works to the detriment 
of the good functioning of the market.  
4.3 Implementation Schedule
The REMIT entered into force in late December 
2011. However, its full implementation will only 
be achieved in the medium-term.
In 2012, all of the required implementing acts 
will have to be issued and adopted. ACER, for 
instance, will have to define the registration 
details and format and market participants will 
have to register with NRAs. In order to do that, 
national registers will have to be operational 
within 3 months from the adoption of the 
implementing rules. Similarly, within 6 months 
from the adoption of the implementing rules, the 
reporting requirements for transactional and data 
transparency will become applicable. 
Finally, within 18 months from the REMIT’s 
entry into force, Member States will have to 
specify the penalties to be charged in case of 
infringement of the regulation. Therefore, the 
REMIT’s implementation process allows for the 
period between December 2011 and June 2013 to 
be marked by considerable regulatory uncertainty 
over the consequences of potential infringements. 
11  For further details, cf. 2010 Edition of the Report (Mi-
chetti, 2011).
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5. PRO-TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVES OF PUBLIC ENTITIES
Besides the legislative initiative of the European 
institutions to create a tailor-made and dedicated 
regulatory framework, a number of noticeable pro-
transparency actions were undertaken by other 
public entities in 2011. In this regard, the activity 
of CEER, ACER, AU and BNetzA particularly 
deserves to be mentioned.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the 
remarkable activity of ERGEG, “the forerunner 
to ACER”.12 ERGEG, a formal advisory group 
to the European Commission, was created by 
the Commission itself in 200313 and dissolved 
with effect from 1 July 2011, with ACER fully 
operational. ERGEG held a pioneering role in 
the development of transparency and regulatory 
best practices, and considerably contributed 
to highlight the need of a common regulatory 
framework for transparent energy markets in 
Europe.
For instance, in December 2007, during the 
preparatory work for the Third Energy Legislation 
Package, the former DG Tren issued a joint 
mandate to the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) and ERGEG to gather advice 
on whether the existing securities regulation 
(MAD and MiFID) was sufficiently addressing 
market integrity in the electricity and gas markets. 
ERGEG and CESR advised the Commission 
that the securities regulations were not sufficient 
and advanced a number of recommendations for 
the filling of the existing regulatory gaps. Their 
advice was then integrated into the Proposal 
of a Regulation on energy markets integrity 
12  Cfr. CEER’s website: www.energy-regulators.eu.
13  Decision 2003/796/EC, OJ L 296/34 of 14 November 
2003. 
and transparency advanced by the European 
Commission in 2010 (European Commission, 
2010b). 
5.1 Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER)
The Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER) is the body through which Europe’s 
national energy regulators voluntary cooperate.
Between July 2010 and January 2011, CEER 
implemented a remarkable pro-transparency 
initiative: a pilot project called “Energy Trade Data 
Reporting Scheme”. The objectives of the project 
were (CEER, 2011b):
§	Demonstrate the feasibility of an 
efficient, cost effective, comprehensive 
and standardised collection, storage and 
monitoring scheme for energy trade data;
§	Provide representative examples of 
statistical analysis of trade data;
§	Provide examples of trade data analysis 
which may lead to the identification of 
potential market abuses;
§	Provide recommendations for the future 
development of an EU trade data reporting 
and monitoring scheme. 
The project was set up under the overall framework 
of the Financial Services Working Group of the 
European Energy Regulators, and in cooperation 
with the European Federation of Energy Traders 
(EFET) as well as an external consulting firm. 
The geographical scope of the pilot project was 
limited to the “CWE+” area, including France, 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. The project considered only the 
data on the wholesale electricity market, due to 
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Box 1 – Energy Transparency Award (ETA) 2011
CEER was the winner of the Energy Transparency 
Award 2011. The prize was delivered during 
the ETA Ceremony on 9th November 2011 in 
Brussels. 
Following a call for proposals launched in May 
2011, the numerous nominations were evaluated 
according to 8 different criteria: efficiency, 
reproducibility, innovation, simplicity of design 
and implementation, responsiveness to users’ 
needs, leverage and contribution to market 
oversight improvement.
The Selection Committee, composed of Jorge 
Vasconcelos (Chair), Jean-Michel Glachant, 
Peter Kaderjak and Jan Moen decided to 
assign the 2011 ETA to CEER, recognising 
in particular its contribution to the 
implementation of transparency regulation 
at European level through the pilot project 
“Energy Trade Data Reporting Scheme”.  
According to the Selection Committee:
“The CEER Pilot Project Energy Trade Data 
Reporting Scheme demonstrated within a period 
of only six months that the establishment of an 
effective European monitoring of wholesale 
energy trading based on a largely electronic data 
collection will be challenging, but is feasible. It 
served as a prototype for the implementation 
of the Regulation on Energy Market Integrity 
and Transparency and hence it contributed to 
persuade EU legislators about the possibility and 
usefulness of more systemic and sophisticated 
EU-wide market monitoring”.14 
the higher liquidity and faster data availability 
compared to the gas market. However, the 
conclusions of the project are deemed to have 
general implications for the gas market too.
The electricity data considered during the pilot 
project covered OTC, brokers and exchanges 
trading venues and the following products and 
markets: OTC and exchange trading, physical and 
financial energy markets, spot and derivatives. 
Moreover, fundamental data on generation outages 
was collected from both public and non-public 
sources. The monitoring was performed through 
a type of software commonly used in financial 
markets, which was re-adapted according to the 
specificities of the wholesale energy markets. 
CEER published the final report in May 2011, 
providing the findings concerning the prototype 
of an electricity and gas trade reporting and 
monitoring scheme. The last two sections of the 
report (Section 5 and Section 6) are respectively 
dedicated to the provisions of recommendations for 
a future European trade data reporting scheme, and 
to the analysis of the pilot project results in view of 
the REMIT. In particular, the report highlights that:
“The vision developed in the course of the pilot 
project is a central EU energy trade database, 
possibly administered by ACER, enabling a 
simple reporting from market participants 
and an effective monitoring of the energy 
wholesale market for all relevant authorities, 
monitoring the energy wholesale market 
under their respective energy regulatory, 
financial market or competition legislation.”
14 The decisions of the Selection Committee, as well as more 
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5.2 Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER)
The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), located in Ljubljana, is part 
of the new institutional framework introduced by 
the Third Energy Legislation Package, adopted in 
2009 and in force since March 2011.
The tasks, organisation and operation of ACER are 
set out in the legal acts forming the Third Package 
and, in particular, in its founding regulation: 
Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators.15 
ACER’s mission is to cooperate with NRAs and 
other EU institutions to develop common rules 
for the internal energy market and the operation 
of the European energy grids. Moreover, ACER’s 
role is to complement the activity of NRAs by 
providing EU-level regulatory oversight.
Since its launch in March 2011, ACER has already 
delivered a series of instruments dedicated to the 
completion of the single energy market, including:
•	 Opinions on the ENTSO-E and ENTSO-G 
Statutes, Rules of Procedure and list of members 
(published in May 2011);
•	 Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation 
and congestion Management for Electricity 
(published in July 2011);
•	 Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation 
Mechanisms for the European Gas Transmission 
Network (published in August 2011).     
details on the Energy Transparency Award 2011, are available at the 
following link: http://www.florence-school.eu/portal/page/portal/
FSR_HOME/ENERGY/Energy_Market_Transparency_Award. 
15  OJ L 211/1 of 14 August 2009.  
ACER has rapidly taken over its tasks according 
to its founding Regulation and the fundamental 
role recognised by the REMIT in the promotion 
of energy markets’ integrity and transparency (cf. 
Section 3).  
5.3 Acquirente Unico (AU)
In Italy, Acquirente Unico (AU) (“Single Buyer”) is 
a not-for-profit company which was set up in 1999 
in order to ensure the supply of electricity to the 
customers of the captive market, i.e., the customers 
who do not exert their right to choose the supplier, 
in accordance with the EU provisions on the Single 
Buyer.16 By purchasing in the wholesale market the 
energy which distributors must resell to captive 
consumers, AU works as a kind of aggregator 
between the customers and the market. 
Since the full-opening of the market in July 2007, 
AU is tasked with the provision of electricity 
supply to the small consumers (households and 
small businesses connected at low voltage, with 
less than 50 employees and a yearly turnover not 
exceeding € 10 m) which do not wish to migrate 
to the open market. These consumers represent the 
market for the protected price regime (“servizio 
di maggior tutela”). In order to source its energy, 
AU can trade in regulated (spot and forward) 
markets and hold auctions under transparent and 
non-discriminatory procedures. A number of pro-
transparency initiatives can be related to AU’s 
activity.
AU posts demand forecasts and details about the 
composition of its procurement portfolio (type 
of contracts, duration, amount of electricity and 
16  Decreto Legislativo del Presidente della Repubblica 
Italiana of 16 March 1999 no. 79, published on the Gazzetta Uf-
ficiale no. 75 of 31 March 1999: “Implementation of Directive 
96/92/CE establishing common rules for the internal electricity 
market in the European Union”.  
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prices) on its website. In October 2010, AU also 
implemented an energy auction portal concerning 
a number of products: physical bilateral, contracts 
for differences, transmission capacity, green 
certificates and guarantees of origin. The portal 
allowed to considerably reduce the time required 
to hold auctions as well as improve the efficiency 
of the overall process of bid submission. Moreover, 
the portal allows operators to retrieve information 
about rules for participation, contractual standards 
and all data concerning the auctions already 
concluded.  
Following Law No. 99/2009, the AU has been 
charged by the Italian energy Authority with the 
responsibility to implement customer protection 
services.17 The AU’s Help Desk is a call centre 
providing information about the functioning of the 
liberalised market and consumers’ rights. It also 
collects consumers’ complaints concerning unfair 
contractual practices and incorrect information 
provided by operators. Moreover, the AU Help 
Desk reports about these issues to the Italian 
energy Authority.   
Finally, starting from 2010, AU has been 
responsible for the operation of the Integrated 
Information System (Sistema Informatico 
Integrato, SII). The data base concerns energy end-
users in Italy, and collects the information about 
switching and consumers’ bills, to be released 
upon request of suppliers and distributors. The 
Italian energy Authority recognised AU a role in 
the design and development of the system. The 
system allows to integrate and exchange data on 
energy consumers, as well as make the switching 
process faster and more secure.  
17  Legge No. 99/2009 of 23 July 2009: “Disposizioni per lo 
sviluppo e l’internazionalizzazione delle imprese, nonché in ma-
teria di energia”, published on Gazzetta Ufficiale no.176 of 31 July 
2009. 
5.4 Bundesnetzagentur
In Germany, The Federal Agency for Networks - 
i.e, Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railway - (BNetzA), is the regulatory authority.
In recent years, BNetzA has constantly worked for 
the improvement of transparency in both gas and 
electricity markets. For instance, in 2011, BNetzA 
started monitoring to what extent German TSOs 
were publishing the required information on all 
the relevant points of their transmission systems, 
also in light of the Gas Regional Initiative North-
West (GRI NW) transparency project.18
6. “SELF-REGULATION” FOR 
TRANSPARENCY: POWER EXCHANGES
The governance of European energy markets 
transparency, consisting in the establishment and 
in the enforcement of rules, has been developing 
also through the initiative of private operators. 
Energy market operators can implement a variety 
of mechanisms favouring information disclosure 
and data reporting, thus going beyond the 
requirements deriving from the existing law. 
Generally speaking, both the public and the private 
dimension of governance are relevant in light of the 
overall development of transparency in European 
energy trading. The co-existence of private and 
public rules and enforcement mechanisms reflects 
the multi-level governance of transparency with 
regard to the specific dimension of the nature of 
the enforcers.19 The different levels interplay and 
compete in creating governance, and provided 
that there is a sufficient level of coordination, 
18  The Gas Regional Initiative North-West includes the 
following participating countries: Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Northern 
Ireland, Norway (observer).
19  Cfr. European Energy Markets Transparency Report 
2010 (Michetti, 2011).
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efficient outcomes may be achieved. For this 
reason, all self-regulation initiatives - such as 
market conduct rules, grid codes, monitoring 
mechanisms, disclosure requirements - represent 
important tools for the development of transparent 
energy markets.
The main difference between the two levels of 
governance is that while public governance applies 
to all market operators, and thus, creates universal 
conditions for better trading across Europe, self-
regulation initiatives inevitably originate a certain 
level of disharmonisation, since they favour the 
uneven achievement of specific transparency and 
integrity standards. However, it wasn’t before 
the end of 2011 that energy trading was provided 
with a dedicated EU-level framework of specific 
binding rules to be implemented in all of the 
Member States. Therefore, especially until that 
moment, the initiatives of market operators have 
been playing a fundamental role in the promotion 
of transparent energy markets. 
This year, our Report will focus on the 
transparency developments of power exchanges, 
which provide centralised structures for energy 
trading, as opposed to bilateral trading and OTC 
transactions. 
6.1 Case Study No. 1: EEX (Euro-
pean Energy Exchange AG)
EEX (European Energy Exchange AG) is an 
energy exchange with headquarters in Leipzig, 
Germany. In 2011 the exchange had 219 
trading participants from 20 different countries, 
Table 2. EEX volumes of trades for 2011 compared to 2010
EEX Markets 2010 2011 Change
Power Spot mkt (Auction+Intraday) –
EPEX spot volumes (TWh) 
279.0 314.0 +12.5%
Power Derivatives mkt (TWh) 1,208.0 1,075.0 -11.0%
Thereof OTC-Clearing (TWh) 712.0 577.0 -19.0%
Thereof exchange traded (TWh) 496.0 498.0 +0.4%
Natural Gas Spot mkt (TWh) 15.0 23.0 +53.3%
Natural Gas Derivatives mkt (TWh) 31.8 35.5 +11.0%
Emissions Spot mkt (1000 tonnes) 25,184.0 25,640.0 +1.8%
Emissions Derivatives mkt (1000 
tonnes)
127,197.0 81,048.0 -36.3%
Coal Derivatives mkt (1000 tonnes) 1,350.0 420.0 -68.9%
Source: Our elaboration of data provided by EEX, 9 March 2012.
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compared to 206 participants in 2010 (data 
provided by EEX).
EEX offers trading venues for the following 
markets: power spot and derivatives, natural 
gas spot and derivatives, emissions spot and 
derivatives as well as coal derivatives.   
Table 2 shows that EEX trading volumes 
increased in 2011 as regards the power spot 
market, the exchange traded derivatives market, 
all of the natural gas markets as well as the 
emissions spot market.
Market data concerning all products traded 
on EEX are available in electronic format as 
Info-Products (EEX, 2012). The Info-Products 
concern both End-of-Day and Delayed data. 
The former includes data on volumes and prices 
after the closure of trading, final settlement prices 
for all trading products as well as aggregated 
representation of individual trades (all available 
in CVS, XLS and XML formats), while the latter 
includes daily volumes and prices with a 15- to 
20- minute delay, prices of all trades for all trading 
products, as well as per-second representation of 
individual trades (available in XML format). The 
Info-Products also provide Historical data - that 
is all data until the end of the previous year -, and 
Current data – that is all data concerning the 
current and the previous year.
Further informative means used by EEX include: 
SMS for the prices from the EEX and EPEX 
Spot, RSS-Feed on planned and unplanned 
unavailability of power plants (without delay), 
as well as Reports. The Reports (in PDF format) 
provide detailed information on power plant 
data or CO2 emissions. The “Daily Transparency 
Report”, for instance, is a daily newsletter 
concerning the German/Austrian market area 
and providing fundamental information on the 
availability of power plants and on the actual feed-
in by both conventional and renewable sources of 
energy.
To safeguard that the processes of trading and 
pricing are carried out fairly and free from 
manipulations, an autonomous and independent 
body of the exchange, the Market Surveillance was 
formed. The Market Surveillance records all the 
data regarding exchange trading and the settlement 
of trades on a daily basis, evaluates these and carries 
out any investigation activities which might be 
required. In addition to this, it carries out special 
investigations on its own initiative or upon an 
instruction to that end by the exchange supervisory 
authority. The Market Surveillance commands far-
reaching rights to demand and obtain information 
in order to be able to fulfil its tasks.
Transparency in Energy Markets Plat-
form
The “Transparency in Energy Markets” platform, 
established in October 2009, represents a 
remarkable initiative of EEX toward the 
achievement of higher level of transparency in 
energy trade. The platform was at first established 
though the collaboration of EEX with the four 
German transmission operators (50Hertz 
Transmission GmbH, Amprion GmbH, EnBW 
Transport-netze AG, TenneT TSO GmbH) and 
now includes Austria too (EEX, 2012). The platform 
offers the possibility to share the information 
which plays a crucial role in ensuring market well-
functioning and efficient outcomes in European 
energy markets. The access to the content of the 
platform is allowed to trading companies, analysts, 
journalists and public authorities via an ftp server. 
The information disclosure is based on both 
statutory and voluntary information provided by 
market operators of the German/Austrian area.
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The statutory publication requirements concern 
(data provided by EEX):
•	 Installed capacities (per generation unit), for 
generation units equal or larger than 100 MW
•	 Planned non-usabilities of generation units 
equal or larger than 100 MW;
•	 Planned and actual production of convention-
al units equal or larger than 100 MW;
•	 Expected and actual production for wind and 
solar power plants;
•	 Planned and unscheduled non-usabilities of 
generation and consumption units equal or 
larger than 100 MW. 
The information disclosed on a voluntary basis 
concern all generation units, independent of their 
size, and may include (data provided by EEX):
•	 Installed generation capacity;
•	 Available generation capacity;
•	 Generation of the previous day. 
The platform facilitates the process of data reporting 
to ACER from market operators established by 
the REMIT, since it can take over messages to 
ACER by market participants in aggregate terms. 
Moreover, the disclosing of information on the 
platform can help prevent inside trading or other 
abusive conducts which work to the detriment of 
competition and market well-functioning (EEX, 
2012).     
The improvement implemented into the platform 
during 2011 concerned both technical aspects and 
the content (EEX, 2012). In particular, starting 
from November 2011 the facilities with less than 
1 MW have been included in the message on the 
installed generation capacities, and the installed 
wind and solar facilities have been updated on 
a quarterly basis. Moreover, the improvements 
also concerned the IT security and the general 
technical performance of the platform. In 2011 
the platform was visited by approximately 15,000 
different visitors every month, tripling the average 
number of visitors in 2010 (EEX, 2012). 
The comparison of the performance indicators 
of the platform in 2010 and 2011, highlighted in 
Table 3, shows that the total number of reporting 
companies increased from 26 to 39 and the 
growth was particularly remarkable in Austria, 
Table 3. Performance indicators of the transparency platform in 2011 (2010 in brackets)
Germany Austria Entire Market Area 
Germany/Austria
Total number of reporting companies 29 (24) 10 (2) 39 (26)
Coverage for statutory publications 93% (89%) 100% 94%
Coverage for voluntary publications 42% (48%) 71% 45%
 Source: EEX (2012)
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where the number increased from 2 to 10. As for 
Germany, the percentage of coverage for voluntary 
publications decreased by 6%, against a 4% 
increase in the percentage of coverage for statutory 
publications: this shows that the willingness of 
market operators to disclose extra information 
should not be given for granted. The degree of 
coverage is precisely calculated on the basis on the 
ratio between the power plant capacity reported 
on the platform and the total power plant capacity 
located in the control area in Germany or Austria. 
Another interesting fact highlighted in Table 3 is 
that there is a considerable difference between the 
percentage of coverage in Germany and Austria, 
with the latter reporting higher percentages in 
terms of both statutory and voluntary publications 
(EEX, 2012).
Reporting companies are those with generating 
units equal or larger than 100 MW. Moreover, 
most of these companies and a further number 
of small undertakings report additional data on a 
voluntary basis. Finally, both the German and the 
Austrian TSOs use the platform to report relevant 
information (data provided by EEX).
Furthermore, in 2011 the platform has proven that 
both statutory and voluntary sections are open 
to further countries or market participants and 
can be expanded with data from other countries 
20  More information on Powernext’s history available at: 
Powernext – “History”,  http://www.powernext.com/#sk;tp=app
;n=page;f=getPage;t=page;fp=system_name:History;lang=en_
US;m=Powernext_Group.  
21  Cf. articles 14 to 17 of the Law n. 2005-781 of 13 July 
2005 establishing the programme for energy policy (aka “Loi 
POPE”). The CEEs are recognised under certain conditions from 
the Ministry of Energy to those who take actions for energy sav-
ings, in all sectors (residential, industrial, farming, transport). 
The mechanim relies on the obligation established on energy 
suppliers to realise energy savings and obtain CEEs based on the 
number of KWh saved. Moreover, these eligible operators are also 
incentivised to promote energy efficiency with their customers, 
such as local authorities. Alternatively, the eligible operators also 
have the chance to buy the CEEs from other operators who imple-
mented actions for energy savings. Further details available (in 
French) at: Ministère de l’Ecologie, du Développement durable, 
des Transport et du Logement – “CEE : Principes du Dispositif”, 
http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Principes-du-dis-
positif.html.
Box 2 - Powernext’s History 2008-201220
Starting from the establishment of Powernext 
Day-Ahead market in 2001, Powernext has 
managed the French power market (spot and 
futures) until 2008.
In November 2008 Powernext Gas spot and 
Powernext Gas Futures were launched. One 
month later the activities and the staff of 
Powernext Day-Ahead, Powernext Intraday and 
market coupling were transferred into EPEX 
Spot. Powernext currently holds a stake of 50% 
of this company, which operates the power spot 
market in France, Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria.
In April 2009 Powernext transferred French 
Power Futures Market (Powernext Futures) into 
EEX Power Derivatives. Powernext acquired in 
return a stake of 20% of this company, which 
trades power futures in France and Germany.
From that moment, Powernext specialised 
in spot and future markets for gas trading. 
Powernext launched the OTC Clearing service 
for Powernext Gas Futures in October 2010, and 
the Powernext Energy Savings market in January 
2012. Powernext Energy Savings is a spot 
market for the French “Certificats d’Economies 
d’Energie”, CEEs (Energy Saving Certificates).21
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relatively easily. For instance, the publication of 
fundamental data regarding the generation of 
power from Austria was launched in July 2011, 
within the implementation of the statutory 
requirements. Moreover, the existing voluntary 
messages by Austrian power plant operators 
were expanded considerably. Starting from the 
beginning of 2012, the voluntary section of the 
transparency platform has been offering also the 
information on Czech Republic (EEX, 2012).
6.2 Case Study No. 2: Powernext
The Powernext gas markets allow trading natural 
gas on the French gas exchange points (PEGs), the 
virtual points which enable shippers to exchange 
Table 4. Powernext’s volumes of trade in 2011 by month and comparison with 2010 (TWh)
2011
Powernext Gas Spot
Powernext 
Gas Futures
OTC 
Clearing
PEG 
Nord
PEG 
Sud
PEG Sud/
Nord
PEG 
TIGF
PEG Nord PEG Nord
January 1.34 0.53 0.00 0.08 14.77 13.80
February       1.44 0.47 0.00 0.04 4.01 5.07
March 1.63 0.31 0.00 0.00 5.14 5.80
April 1.05 0.26 0.00 0.03 2.07 1.63
May 1.08 0.15 0.08 0.00 2.63 3.94
June 2.08 0.27 0.04 0.03 3.32 5.03
July 1.28 0.27 0.08 0.00 1.70 0.80
August 2.09 0.15 0.11 0.00 1.94 0.61
September 2.26 0.33 0.14 0.00 3.39 2.65
October 2.39 0.17 0.08 0.01 4.89 3.86
November 2.19 0.21 0.12 0.07 3.87 2.05
December 2.04 0.15 0.07 0.07 6.30 1.20
Total 20.87 3.27 0.72 0.33 54.03 46.44
Change (Tot 
2010)
+100% +28% n.a. -48% +99% n.a.
Source: Our elaboration of data provided by Powernext, 27 April 2012.
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titles of gas. There are three hubs in France: PEG 
Nord and PEG Sud (operated by GRT Gaz, a 
subsidiary of GDF-Suez), and finally PEG TIGF 
(operated in the south-western part of France by 
TIGF, a subsidiary of Total).
The Powernext Gas Spot market offers three 
types of spot contracts on all of the 3 PEGs: 
Within-Day, Day-Ahead and Week-End. The first 
type of contracts are meant to enable the intraday 
arbitrage and balancing for the running gas day - 
considering that the French gas transport network 
operator offers daily and not hourly balancing -; 
the second type of contracts allows buying and 
selling gas for the next gas business day; finally, the 
third type of contracts allows buying and selling 
gas for the coming week-end. 
The Powernext Gas Futures market offers Futures 
contracts only on PEG Nord and enables to 
trade for the next 3 months, the next 2 quarters 
and the next 3 gas seasons. These contracts are 
continuously traded from 9am to 6pm on business 
days. 
As of April 2012, Powernext had 43 members 
in its gas spot market and 37 members in its gas 
future market (data provided by Powernext). The 
volumes of trade for 2011 are reported in Table T4. 
The pro-transparency intiatives of Powernext 
concern the disclosure of transactional information 
and in particular, the provision of price references 
both in the spot and in the futures market (data 
provided by Powernext). 
Transactional Data 
The transactional data disclosed by Powernext 
includes both end of session and real-time data. 
As for end of session data, Powernext discloses 
the information concerning all of the transactions 
concluded on the market at the end of each 
negotiation day, 15 minutes after the end of 
the trading session. The information provided 
concerns: the time of transaction; product 
characteristics, such as the delivery area, type of 
product, first and last delivery days and number 
of days; total traded volume (MWh/day); total 
traded volume for the whole contract period 
(MWh); as well as the price (Eur/MWh). The 
names of the parties involved in the transactions 
are not disclosed in order to ensure anonymity 
and prevent discretionary practises. All the 
transactions are anonymously recorded in two 
files published on Powernext’s website, namely 
Powernext Gas Spot Daily Transactions and 
Powernext Gas Futures Daily Transactions. Every 
day at the end of each trading session, Powernext 
also publishes the “open interest”, that is the sum of 
the open positions held by each market participant 
on each product.
As for real-time data, Powernext publishes real-
time information on its transactions through 
Bloomberg, Montel and Thomson Reuters. 
During each trading session and close to real time 
(10 minutes delay), these data providers publish 
the information on the transactions that are 
concluded and the order book, listing all the bid/
ask orders. 
Price Reference Spot
The Price References Spot indexes are available on 
Powernext website and are used as fundamental 
reference in operational contracts (e.g., for 
infrastructure operators to adjust their position), 
as well as in commercial contracts stipulated 
by other market operators. The two indexes 
available are the Powernext Gas Spot End of 
Day Price (EOD) and the Powernext Gas Spot 
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Daily Average Price (DAP). The EOD index is a 
closing-time reference price provided for a given 
product on the grounds of the trades concluded 
over the settlement period (15 minutes, from 
16:30 to 16:45) close to the end of the trading 
session. The DAP index is an all-day reference 
price calculated as a volume-weighted average of 
all the trade prices registered for a given product 
during the entire trading session. 
Price References Futures
The Price References Futures indexes are 
available on Powernext website and include the 
Powernext Gas Futures Settlement Prices and 
the Powernext Gas Futures Monthly Index. 
The settlement prices are closing prices based 
on trades and bid/ask spreads over a 15 minutes 
period (between 16:30 and 16:45). They are 
calculated every trading day on the contracts 
available for negotiation, based on a methodology 
that is also available on Powernext’s website. The 
monthly index is published by Powernext on a 
monthly basis and is calculated as the simple 
average of daily settlement prices of the front 
month contract. 
Fundamental Data
Powernext does not directly disclose information 
on fundamental data on gas market, such as: 
capacity availability and unavailability on the 
transport network, LNG and storage capacity 
availability, etc. However, through its website it 
provides links to institutions and organisations 
which provide fundamental data: regulatory 
bodies such as the French energy regulator (CER), 
ACER, CEER and the European Commission; 
transmission system operators (GRTgaz, TIGF); 
distribution system operators (GrDF); and storage 
system operators (Storengy, TIGF). 
Monitoring 
Powernext implements market surveillance 
routines and procedures in order to detect possible 
abuses or misconducts and pays particular 
attention to the admission of new market operators 
to avoid fraud and other opportunistic behaviours. 
The monitoring activities are implemented in 
cooperation with sector specific regulatory bodies. 
Conclusions on the Self-Regulation 
of Power Exchanges
In the pre-REMIT era, with no common regulatory 
framework in force at EU-level, the initiatives 
of market operators - for instance, in terms of 
promotion of information disclosure and market 
surveillance -, were among the few available tools 
to boost market well-functioning. 
Even though most of energy trading in Europe 
occurs through OTC, energy power exchanges 
have certainly led the way in terms of pro-
transparency best practices. Energy exchanges 
provide centralised structures and platforms 
for energy trading, as opposed to bilateral and 
OTC trading, and this centralisation offers the 
opportunity to collect the information and share 
it with market participants. Besides, energy 
exchanges have a strong interest in guaranteeing 
fair pricing mechanisms to their users: the higher 
the confidence that operators have in the pricing 
mechanisms of the centralised trading system, the 
higher the number of market participants using 
the exchange will be. Even though to different 
extents and with different formats and procedures, 
nowadays exchanges disclose information 
concerning both the transactions taking place and 
the fundamental data that is necessary in order 
for market operators to take efficient trading 
choices. Moreover, they typically implement 
surveillance mechanism to avoid misconducts 
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and unlawful market practices. As a result, the 
price and quantity signals deriving from energy 
exchanges are generally deemed reliable and their 
price references indexes are used as benchmark 
for OTC transactions.
However, the absence of standardised rules for 
information disclosure and monitoring, as well 
as the reliance on information disclosed on a 
voluntary basis, allowed a rather disharmonised 
development of transparency practices 
across Europe. For instance, voluntary based 
information disclosure cannot always guarantee 
sufficient transparency standards, since in some 
circumstances market participants may not want 
to share all the relevant information they have in 
order to retain an advantage towards to the other 
competitors. In this context, the REMIT offers 
a unique opportunity to raise and level out the 
transparency standards in all the energy trading 
activities in Europe, both exchange- and OTC- 
based, also taking into account the transparency 
best practices implemented so far. By establishing 
common binding rules for all energy trading 
activity in Europe, the new set of rules dedicated 
to market integrity and transparency has the 
potential to achieve more even transparency 
standards, guarantee a level playing field and 
ensure a more transparent trading environment to 
all European energy traders.
6.3 Case Study No. 3: Nord Pool 
Spot
Nord Pool Spot is the spot exchange of the Nordic 
countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, 
Norway, and Sweden are the principle owners 
(Latvia, the remaining Baltic country, is expected 
to join Nord Pool Spot in the near future). Nord 
Pool Spot has its headquarters in Oslo, Norway. 
In 2011 the exchange had 370 trading participants 
from 20 different countries.
Nord Pool Spot has two markets: Elspot, the day-
ahead market and Elbas, the intraday market. 
Elspot is a day-ahead market for the physical 
delivery of electricity in which hourly supply and 
demand bids for the next day are aggregated and 
matched. The resulting market clearing price is 
the system price. Absent transmission constraints, 
all electricity is traded for the system price. The 
system price also constitutes the reference price 
that is used for power derivatives. Elspot is Europe’s 
most liquid day-ahead market: more than 70% of 
Nordic power consumption is bought on Elspot. 
Elbas is an intraday market with continuous power 
trading up to the hour prior to delivery.
Nord Pool Spot also operates, together with 
NASDAQ OMX, the UK power market N2EX.
NASDAQ OMX is the financial market for the 
Nordic countries. Nord Pool used to operate the 
financial market, but decided to sell it to NASDAQ 
OMX in 2008. NASDAQ OMX trades power 
derivatives such as futures, forwards and options. 
Their time horizons range from a single day up 
to six years. The base load derivates traded at this 
market are daily and weekly futures; monthly, 
quarterly, and yearly forwards; and options and 
contracts for differences. The peak load derivates 
traded at this market are weekly futures and 
monthly, quarterly, and yearly forwards, NASDAQ 
OMX also trades Certified Emission Reductions 
(CER), European Union Allowances (EUA), and 
German, Dutch and UK power derivates. 
Table 5 shows that Nord Pool trading volumes 
are very large relative to the market. The traded 
volumes at Elspot are larger than 70% of the total 
consumption, indicating that Elspot is a deep and 
liquid market.
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Transparency in Energy Markets Plat-
form
Market data concerning all products traded on 
NordPool Spot, dating back to January 2010, are 
available at their website and can be browsed, 
depicted as charts or on maps and downloaded 
in XLS format. Fundamental information, dating 
back to May 2011 can be found under Urgent 
Market Messages (UMMs), where planned, 
unplanned and revisions of planned outages of 
plants or grids are announced. 
The system of Urgent Market Messages was 
implemented already in 2002 and has been further 
developed since as a reporting tool. More recently, 
Nord Pool Spot has implemented several rules in 
line with provisions in the REMIT. The market 
conduct rules implemented in June 2012 contain 
a prohibition on insider trading and disclosure 
requirements for planned and unplanned outages. 
Disclosure should occur within sixty minutes 
after occurrence by means of an Urgent Market 
Messages.
A Market Surveillance monitors trading activities 
and investigates possible breaches of the  market 
conduct rules. Any possible breaches on the 
market conduct rules and national legislation are 
reported to the authorities. Market Surveillance is 
looking for matters likely to have an impact on the 
prices, and whether this information is available 
to all members.  A central activity for Market 
Surveillance is checking the quality of the above 
mentioned Urgent Market Messages.
7. Concluding Remarks
The present Report aimed at picturing the most 
relevant developments of transparency registered 
in the European wholesale energy markets 
during the year 2011, in terms of both public 
governance and private operators’ actions. These 
two fields correspond to different dimensions 
of the governance of transparency, which create 
specific rules for transparency and ensure their 
enforcement.
The private dimension of transparency has played 
a relevant role so far. One example is provided 
by the transparency rules and procedures which 
typically feature energy exchanges, including codes 
of conduct for market participants, information 
disclosure obligations, as well as surveillance 
mechanisms for the detection of abusive practices. 
However, these “self-regulation” initiatives could 
only produce uneven transparency standards 
across Europe, and a binding and tailor-made 
Regulation for energy trading was advocated in 
view of the good functioning of energy wholesale 
markets and of the necessity to guarantee more 
harmonised trading conditions. Binding rules 
Table 5. Nord Pool Spot Markets volumes of trades for 2010 and 2011
Nord Pool Spot Markets 2010 2011
Power Spot mkt Elspot (TWh)
As share of consumption
305.2
74.4%
294.4
73.1%
Power Spot mkt Elbas (TWh) 2.2 2.7 
Source: The Annual report of Nord Pool Spot 2011.
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would have reduced the scope for voluntary 
mechanisms of disclosure - for which market 
participants might have little incentives -, and 
would have created a level playing field for all 
energy trading activities in Europe, including 
both exchange-trade and OTC-trade, which still 
represents the big majority of energy trading in 
Europe. 
For this reason, the adoption of the REMIT 
represents the most remarkable development of 
transparency registered in the year 2011. The new 
European Regulation filled the gaps in the previous 
regulatory framework and thus, made it more 
suitable for nowadays integrated and complex 
energy markets. The new rules apply to all energy 
trading activities in Europe, and therefore aim at 
creating more even transparency standards and 
guarantee more efficient trading environment to 
all energy traders. 
In the context of liberalised energy markets, the 
REMIT represents a powerful tool complementary 
to competition policy in the pursuing of market 
well-functioning. While competition policy 
addresses the issues deriving from the opening 
of the markets - such as the competition between 
incumbent operators with significant market 
power and smaller operators -, the REMIT regulates 
transparency and integrity in market conducts. The 
experience of the European energy markets shows 
that markets fail to provide transparency and 
integrity, so that specific rules and enforcement 
mechanisms are required in order guarantee that i) 
all the relevant information is available to market 
operators (transparency), and ii) the available 
information is not opportunistically used to the 
detriment of fair competition (integrity).
Accordingly, the REMIT defined the market 
misconducts which should be sanctioned across 
the European energy market, and established 
monitoring and surveillance duties aiming at the 
detection and prevention of such misconducts. 
The entry into force of the REMIT allowed 
the development of the public dimension of 
transparency governance, and the definition of 
clear rules concerning the information to be 
disclosed and the misconducts to avoid. The 
REMIT certainly has a remarkable potential in the 
enhancement of fair competition and market well-
functioning.    
However, further challenges lie ahead for the 
development of transparent European energy 
markets. The current mid-term challenges, 
especially for 2012 and 2013, concern precisely the 
implementation of the REMIT.
The implementation of the REMIT will require 
a remarkable work to be undertaken by the 
different parties involved, such as the European 
Commission, ACER and the NRAs. A number 
of issues will have to be addressed, and a few 
examples are: the definition of the most suitable 
format for the disclosure of the information and 
the identification of the transactions that should 
be reported; the creation of national registries 
of market participants; the guarantee that NRAs 
have adequate enforcement and penalty powers 
to punish in case of infringement; the degree 
of harmonisation among the different penalty 
regimes which are going to be set up at national 
level. Furthermore, the issue of the provision of 
sufficiently clear and harmonised rules to market 
participants will have to be addressed, since this 
will inevitably affect their ability to comply with 
the new Regulation. For instance, the fact that 
national obligations are not restricted in light 
of the REMIT and Member States may impose 
additional data collection requirements, exposes 
market participants to a considerable level of 
heterogeneity concerning the nature of the data 
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collection requirement, the submission method, 
the format as well as the language. Similarly, the 
REMIT introduced a registration regime which 
is not going to substitute the different national 
licensing procedures in force nowadays. The 
lack of agreement on the implementation of 
the EU Trading Passport failed to reduce the 
administration burden for market participants, 
and most importantly showed that Member States 
were not willing to accept a single and common 
administrative tool for the registration of market 
participants. 
The extent to which the potential of the REMIT 
will be fully exploited, to the benefits of European 
energy markets and consumers, will depend on 
how efficiently these implementation challenges 
will be addressed in the near future, and on 
whether such implementation will guarantee a 
sufficient level of harmonisation across the EU. 
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